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While Sartre claims that all human relations share the same 
fundamental ontological structure, the dismal picture he paints in Being 
and Nothingness in which he describes the lover-beloved relation as two 
subjectivities in conflict, is a far cry from the optimistic portrayal of the 
reader-writer relation as the mutual collaboration of two freedoms in 
What is Literature? It is tempting to explain away this incongruity by 
asserting either that Sartre changed his mind about human relationships, 
or that he is simply inconsistent. While we agree that the reader-writer 
relation does seem to suggest a new dimension of interaction, it is our 
contention that this new dimension is already prefigured in Being and 
Nothingness when Sartre describes the manner in which the present self 
confronts and integrates its history in light of its present and future 
projects. Sartre, we argue, was not able to carry through this analysis to his 
more general description of human relations because he had conflated a 
distinction in his description of consciousness in Transcendence of the Ego 
and Being and Nothingness. By reviewing and revising his account of the 
nature of consciousness as it stands before itself or another, as described 
in Transcendence of the Ego, we enable the expansion of the realm of 
human relationships beyond the ostensible limits prescribed in Being and 
Nothingness. 
In Being and Nothingness, Sartre's description of the concrete 
relation with others as exemplified by the relation of love seems to lead to 
an ontological paradox: 
Why should I want to appropriate the Other if it were not 
precisely that the Other makes me be? . . . The lover 
does not desire to possess the beloved as one possesses a 
thing; he demands a special type of appropriation. He 
wants to possess a freedom as freedom . . , He wants to 
be loved by a freedom but demands that this freedom as 
freedom should no longer be free."1 
This relationship is used to demonstrate the ontological dependence of 
the lover on the beloved as well as the paradoxical nature of this 
dependence. Partners, lovers, and, in general, individuals interact by 
oscillating between the antithetical poles of domination and counter-
domination since: "While I attempt to free myself from the hold of the 
Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, (New York, 1963), pp. 366-367. 
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Other, the Other is trying to free himself from mine; while 1 seek to enslave 
the Other, the Other seeks to enslave me."2 
Sartre's description of human love is doubly self-defeating. This 
special type of appropriation requires the Other, as the object of my love, 
not be an automaton. The Other must preserve its autonomy in order to 
freely give or receive love. Yet the lover sadistically relates to the beloved 
by making the beloved into an object. Moreover, the lover experiences 
perpetual insecurity. The Other may only see the lover as an object and 
hence, deprive the lover of his autonomy. As such, all attempts at love, 
and, more generally, human interactions, remain thwarted and unfulfilled 
because both lover and beloved want to have each other as autonomous 
and as objectified which, on this account, is not possible. This paradox is 
succinctly summarised by the line from "No Exit,"~"Hell is other people"— 
which perhaps best epitomises Sartre's early view of society in which 
conflict is the inevitable and unenviable state of human relationships. 
Sartrean individuals appear as uni-dimensional creatures unable to 
genuinely relate to others. On this account, therefore, social relationships 
must ultimately be viewed as insecure, dismal, futile and doomed to a hell 
void of joy. Man is a "useless passion" because he cannot overcome this 
fundamental alienation from the Other. 
By 1947, however, Sartre had come to moderate this view of human 
relationships, motivated, in large part, by his reflections on aesthetics and, 
in particular, on the pivotal role that he ascribes to reading. In What is 
Literature?, Sartre offers a description of the relationship between the 
writer and the reader which is different from the one between lovers since 
the writer and the reader relate cooperatively to each other. Borrowing * 
heavily from Croce's theory of aesthetics, Sartre argues that the writer does 
not write for himself but rather writes for readers whose constitutive role is 
needed to complete the creation of the work. Just as the painter needs the 
spectator, the composer, the listener, the writer needs the reader to 
complete the work. Reading, as Sartre puts it, is the "dialectical 
correlative" of writing. Writing and reading necessitate two distinct agents 
who are co-subjects in the creation of a mutual object. As such, writing and 
reading require a "pact of generosity" between the author and the reader. 
"Thus," according to Sartre, "the author writes in order to address 
himself to the freedom of readers, and he requires it in order to make his 
work exist."3 The writer, however, must also be respected by the reader. 
The writer "requires that (the reader] return this confidence he has given 
them, and that they recognise [the writer's] creative freedom."4 In order to 
successfully bring the work of art to completion, the reader, must see the 
2Jb«f.,p.364. 
3 Jean-Paul Sartre, What is Literature? and Other Essays, (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1988), p. 58. 
4JWd.,p.58. 
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10 m.t p. 65. 
work as crafted by an author who has "introduced order where there was 
none" 5 and who serves as the reader's guide. It is the hope of the writer 
that the more the reader experiences his freedom in the act of reading, the 
more attuned the reader becomes to the freedom of the writer—the more 
the writer demands of the reader, the more the reader demands of him. 6 
The novel completes itself only if the reader responds to the words in 
the book and projects an imaginary world of people and actions beyond 
them. The reader is solicited to perform the task of recomposing the 
"beautiful object beyond the traces left by the artist." 7 The reader must 
"invent" the novel. For Sartre, reading presupposes the essentiality of both 
subject and the object. The object (in this case, the novel as produced by 
the writer) is essential because it is strictly transcendent; the novel imposes 
it's own structure and the reader must await its unfolding, even as he 
anticipates the action that is to come, and observe it. Correlatively, the 
reader is required to disclose or make the object appear and ensure that 
the object is produced, 8 consumed and enjoyed. 
Through reading, the reader animates the world of the object (i.e., the 
novel) which presents itself with a unique prefigured structure. In doing 
this the reader becomes aware of inhabiting the world of the novel and yet 
retains his awareness of himself as one who has chosen to animate it. Or, 
as Sartre puts it: 
reading is creation, my freedom does not only appear to 
itself as pure autonomy but as creative activity, that is, it 
is not limited to giving itself its own law but perceives 
itself as being constitutive of the object. 9 
This makes possible aesthetic enjoyment which requires that the reader 
be aware of both the object as object and of his own aesthetic 
accomplishment. If we do not preserve the world of the novel as ours, as 
one we inhabit, we cannot enjoy it, and yet if we do not preserve our 
constitutive role, we lose the enjoyment of creation. Thus aesthetic 
enjoyment is both engaged and creative: "it sustains the being of a world 
which is both its world and the 'external' world." 1 0 
This ability to preserve the constitutive roles that the reader-writer 
relation discloses is not peculiar to literature, or, indeed, to the activity of 
reading texts. The present phase of consciousness relates to the past 
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phases of itself as having been free yet, it also sees them as objects 
malleable for its present projects.il The present phase engages in an 
activity akin to reading as it confronts and reactivates its past, which was 
authored by a previous phase. Sartre writes of the past phase: "'my' past is 
first of all mine; that is, it exists as the function of a certain being which 1 
am." 1 2 Just as the "being" of the present phase is to be free and 
spontaneous, so must the "being" of the past phase be seen as previously 
free and spontaneous, even though, from the stand-point of the present, it 
appears as an object devoid of freedom. Consequently the past phase was 
free and spontaneous and, as we describe this freedom, we ought to be 
able to reactivate it as such. As we shall show, Sartre's account of the 
nature of consciousness in Transcendence of the Ego precludes the 
possibility of this activity of reactivation in which the spontaneity of both 
the author and the past phase is preserved. 
We begin by adumbrating Sartre's account of the nature of reflection 
and its implications for a theory of consciousness. Whenever we reflect on 
our conscious processes we find that the reflecting conscious process 
directs itself to the reflected-upon conscious process, which did not reflect 
on itself previously but was, instead, a straightforward consciousness of 
whatever.13 Consciousness of itself as consciousness of its object can be 
both aware of its object and aware of itself without making itself into an 
object; that is, it is not objectivating itself. Each conscious process, whether 
reflective or not, is also conscious of itself as it is conscious of whatever. 
This consciousness (of) consciousness of whatever is the fundamental level 
of consciousness.14 
Now, consciousness is initially not an object for itself; it is spontaneous 
in its intentionality and directed entirely toward the object of which it is 
conscious. There is no room for a substantial ego at this level because 
such an ego would introduce opacity into consciousness, thereby 
1 1 For reasons we develop later, Sartre explicates consciousness as being a 
unified stream of impersonal, non-egological, phases whose egoic 
structure, and, consequently, self, only appears in reflection. In order to 
conform to this description we use the phrase "phases of consciousness" to 
escape the implication that consciousness, as it acts, contains a substantial 
self who is independent of the process. Similarly, we shall use the phrase 
"partial extents" to indicate, for purposes of analysis, phases of 
consciousness which we can delimit and make salient in our reflective 
focusing. 
1 2 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 110. 
1 3 We have chosen to use the term "whatever" to indicate the object of 
consciousness in order to allow for the possibility of consciousness being 
aware of something and not objectivating it. 
1 4 Jean-Paul Sartre, Transcendence of the Ego, (New York: Fairer, Straus & 
Giroux,1957),p.40. 
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destroying the essential spontaneity of consciousness. The two main 
problems to be confronted about this fundamental level of consciousness 
are: one, the explication of the way consciousness unifies itself into one 
conscious self and, two, how it can both view itself as an object for itself, a 
self or ego, and yet retain an awareness of itself as having been free. 
Consciousness is able to unify itself because it is not unidimensional; 
rather, there is an on-going, automatic synthesis of the partial extent of 
consciousness as self-identical, as differentiated from each other, and as 
synthesised into one conscious life. This is made possible through the 
structuring of automatic awarenesses in each phase of consciousness such 
that each maintains itself as previously expected and as subsequently 
retained. In this way consciousness is automatically synthesising itself into 
one identical stream as it adverts from one thing to another and is thus 
busied. 
Even if these automatic processes synthesise themselves, Sartre must 
still explain how reflection reveals the previous phase as having been both 
free and as having seen the act of a self. To account for this dimension of 
reflection, Sartre describes these automatic processes as non-positionally 
aware of themselves as they are actively engaged with whatever.15 He 
writes: 
For example, I am absorbed just now in my reading. I 
am going to try to remember the circumstances of my 
reading, my attitude, the lines that I was reading. I was 
thus going to revive not only these external details but a 
certain depth of unreflected consciousness, since the 
objects could only have been perceived by that 
consciousness and since they remain relative to it. That 
consciousness must not be posited as object of a 
reflection. On the contrary, I must direct my attention to 
the revived objects, but without losing sight of the 
unreflected consciousness, by joining in a sort of 
conspiracy with it and by drawing up an inventory of its 
content in a non-positional manner. There is no doubt 
about the result: while I was reading, there was 
consciousness of the book, of the heroes of the novel, but 
the I was not inhabiting this consciousness. It was only 
consciousness of the object and non-positional 
consciousness of itself.16 
By "non-positional" Sartre appears to mean consciousness does not 
objcctivate whatever, nor does it believe or disbelieve in its object as 
existent; that is, it "suspends" its belief in the existence of whatever. 
1 6 Sartre, Transcendence of the Ego, pp. 46-47. 
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Sartre believes that this description of reading can serve as a paradigm for 
the possibility of the reactivation and identification of past phases in a 
subsequent reflection which retains an awareness of them as free. By 
thinking that the non-positional awareness of itself, as it acts, allows 
consciousness to preserve itself as a spontaneity, Sartre contends that he 
has enabled reflection to reveal past phases as objects, as free, and as 
mine. It is this last contention that we claim is untenable unless a further 
distinction is made. 
His description, we argue, conflates non-positionality and non- . 
objectivity. Sartre has overlooked the fact that consciousness can be 
intending an object in either a positional, or in a non-positional way, and 
yet be positionally intending that which is not objectivated. For example, 
while reading I suspend my belief that this story is real or factual-its world 
is too cohesive, too beautiful, to be about my booming, buzzing and 
confusing world. Sartre has not, however, seen or allowed for the possibility 
that I will still be synthesising this partial extent of consciousness in 
identifying and differentiating syntheses which are positional. Unless they 
are positional they cannot be reactivated as ours because there is no basis . 
for acknowledging them as ours. Regardless of its position with respect to 
the object, each partial extent always believes in itself with simple 
certainty; it posits itself as existing and as its own. If this non-reflective 
positional awareness of each partial extent were not taking place, then 
each phase of consciousness could not be retained and expected, 
retrotended and protended, as it was or will be. Nevertheless, Sartre, and 
we, want to claim that each is, was, or will be an impersonal spontaneity. 
Thus, we need to distinguish positionality from objectivation in order 
to see how consciousness can be non-objectivating itself, or any other 
spontaneities, and still be positionally conscious of itself, or whatever, as 
believed in with certainty and as straight-forwardly accepted. Otherwise, 
in any present or subsequent phase of consciousness there would be no 
basis for accepting the spontaneity as mine, or perhaps, as yours. It is this 
distinction that makes possible Sartre's description of reading and the 
attendant aesthetic enjoyment; that is, that I can be both conscious of the 
object and conscious of myself as constitutive of the object. For this to be 
possible there cannot be a neutral non-positional stance towards 
consciousness as it is busied with the story, or else it would not be my 
aesthetic joy. As Sartre maintains, "the being which lives behind it is 
indeed its being and not another being."17 Since this being is mine, it must 
have been identified as mine, as being positionally aware of itself as 
previously expected and subsequently retained as mine, and as 
spontaneous in its inception. 
Having seen how the fundamental level of consciousness (of) 
consciousness of whatever, as it synthesises itself, does not doubt itself as a 
Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 118. 
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spontaneity we can generalise this description to cases of apprehending 
and interacting with other spontaneities. Consciousness has the ability to 
reflect and objectivate itself as the intentional object of my present, 
reflecting phase and grasp it in an automatic consciousness of whatever. 
As it can do this to itself, it can alsq be automatically conscious of whatever 
in a positional, non-objectivating way, even as it is actively objectivating 
this same whatever. 
A closer look at this phenomenon reveals the following as an example: 
As Roquentin looks at Anny as desirable he can also, be automatically 
aware of her gaze, be remembering what she said about wanting perfect 
moments and be expecting her to never again want to have such moments 
with him. These automatic conscious processes are being synthesised with 
the "present" phase of objectivating her as desirable, yet none of this 
requires that there be an ego that is doing all of this, only that the 
synthesising take place in order that in a subsequent phase consciousness 
could objectivate this phase and see it as its own. The part of the phase 
that was actively engaged in seeing her as desirable was given and retains 
an egoic quality by virtue of the positional non-objectivating consciousness 
which makes possible its being seen subsequently as having been 
engaged in by an ego. In this way, there can be consciousness of another 
as an object of my awareness and consciousness of it as one who is 
conscious of me as an object. Hence, it retains its freedom or spontaneity. 
Returning now to the reader-writer relation, in which each subjectivity 
retains "creative" freedom, we can see how Sartre's description can be 
integrated with the above. As I read Nausea and find myself caught up 
wondering how to work through or eliminate the nausea I feel, as does 
Roquentin, I am carrying out the role Sartre required of me as a possible 
reader. In objectivating the novel and getting "caught up" in it, I can be 
automatically positionally conscious of Sartre as freely creating the novel 
and of guiding me through'it. This latter automatic consciousness could 
be objectivated in a later phase of my conscious life and still I would 
automatically and positionally conscious of Sartre as the creative freedom 
who is responsible for Nausea. 
Sartre saw this specific possibility for human interaction when he 
described the reader-writer relation in What is Literature? but failed to 
see that it can permeate all human interactions. In fact, Sartre's seminal 
description of the way consciousness appropriates its past phase as having 
been spontaneous makes possible the account of seeing another as both 
an object and as a spontaneity. As we have shown, however, he failed to 
adequately describe how consciousness can be positionally non-
objectivating itself or another. Consequently, Sartre's account of the lover-
beloved relation was truncated since he failed to utilise the possibilities for 
human interaction he crystallises in Wltat is Literature? 
In conclusion, the pessimism in Being and Nothingness is 
unwarranted. By amending Sartre's description of the nature oi 
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consciousness we show that all human relationships are capable of 
objectivating whatever, thereby not depriving the object of its spontaneity. 
Yet, it can be conscious of whatever in an automatic non-objectivoting 
manner which preserves the spontaneity which may be considered in the 
future. The lover-beloved relation described by Sartre in Being and 
Nothingness is a possible instance of human interaction. It, however, need 
not be the only one. The lover can appropriate the beloved as a freedom 
without the perpetual insecurity of losing his freedom. Conflict need not 
be the original meaning of being-for-others.18 
1 A version of this paper was read at the Sartre Society, Canadian Division, 
Montreal, 1989. We would also like to thank Wendy Ewara for reading 
draft copies of this paper and for her insightful comments. 
